DISPATCH NO.

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DATE: 1 October 1954

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Debriefing of Ko

F: TRIE-2485 dtd 8 September 1954

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Kol Cuni, an Albanian, arrived in Trieste from Yugoslavia on 31 August 154 in possession of a Yugoslav travel permit valid for travel to Trieste. Cuni, the son of Sokol and Suta Premussi, was born in Shkoder, Albania, on 15 December 1915. A clerk, he is single and a member of the Roman Catholic Church. He remained in Trieste until 9 September 1954 at which time he was taken across the FTT-Italian border by Jastrow to Cervignano, Italy, where he was placed on a train bound for Rome.

Cuni was debriefed by . I during the period 31 August - 8 September 1954. did not take notes during the debriefing and, as is evident from an examination of the information provided, Cuni seemed to avoid giving anything but general information on his activities during the last five years.

states that Cuni at times actually attempted to avoid certain subjects of intelligence interest and always succeeded in keeping the discussion on general topics.

is a personal friend of Cuni and the entire debriefing was conducted in an atmosphere of friendly discussion rather than an actual interrogation, which was in line with C position and Cumi's ties with the Italian services.

Cuni was recruited for a mission into Albania by Italian Naval Intelligence during the early part of 1949. He was one of a number of Albanians taken from Italian refugee camps and sent to the Island of Montecristo for training in clandestine operations. None of the Albanians were permitted to leave the Island during the training period; however, on one occasion Cuni and Alush Aleshanaka, another trainee, were permitted one short trip to Rome. During the training period Cuni noticed a certain amount of political speculation on the part of the directors of the Bloku Kombetar Indipendent (KI) because Leg Koliqi, the brother of Professor Ernest Volici, and Caf Beg Vlora were included in the training group although /it was known a priori that they would never actually take part in the mission to Albania. Both Koliqi and Vlora were paid even though they were not active.

Approximately 20 Albanians took part in the training program. Cuni could only recall the names of Alush Lleshanaka, Zef/Luka, Gjon/Gjinaj, Gjon Melyshi, and Pasko/Letaj. Among the instructors Cuni recalls Italian Major De Angelis (inu) who taught map-reading and was known as a veteran

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parachutist. Both Cuni and Lleshanaka were given special training in radio transmission. During the training period members of the group received pay at the rate of 30,000 lire per month which was later increased to 60,000 lire per month. In addition, the group received food, clothing and board. The agreement with the Italians provided that members of the group would continue to receive 60,000 lire monthly even when they were on the mission in Albania and, in case of ceath, the money would be given to the family of the deceased.

- Shortly before the group left for Albania an incident between Cuni and members of the EM (in the person of Dr. Ismajl verlaci, Professor Ernest Koliqi and Gjor Markagjori) occurred when Cuni insisted on being told whether or not the Americans were involved in the mission. Cuni had repeatedly been told that the Americans were participating but since he had not seen any American representative during the training period he coubted whether the Americans had knowledge of the mission. Cuni stated that he would not go through with it unless he was assured that the American services were included. Matters took a turn for the worse when Verlaci refused to clarify the nature of American participation. Cuni goes so far as to state that the EKI considered executing him for desertion but Cuni was saved through the intervention of a high official of Italian Naval Intelligence, krego (fnu), who informed Cuni that the American services were well briefed on the mission and were also included in it.
- Before leaving for Albania, the nine members of Cuni's group (names not given) attended church services conducted by a major in the Italian Chaplain Corps. All of the group were members of the moman Catholic Church. Present at the church services were Count Carobio (fmm) and Commandante Beltrame (fnu) both officials of Italian Naval Intelligence, who commanded the operation once it entered Albania.
- Each member of the group was issued cold weather clothing, a machine gun, a Beretta pistol, hand grenades, compasses, Zeiss binoculars, a Rolex watch and a pup tent. The group was also given 300 gold napoleons. The group commanded by Cuni left Rome aboard a tri-motor military simplane at 1635 hours on 28 December 1949. Count Carobio was also aboard the plane and he accompanied the men as far as the jumping-off point. The group jumped at approximately 1975 hours and landed in an area approximately 15 kilometers northwest of Kukes, slightly off the target area. Cumi himself landed on a tree and spent almost two hours freeing himself. In the meanwhile the members of the group were scattered over the entire area and did not manage to regroup until 2300 hours of the same day after having fired a number of pistol shots to locate each other. night was spent walking towards Dardhe. The first radio communication with the Naval Ministry in Rome was made on 29 December 1949. Subsequently Cuni transmitted twice daily as ordered. The group was supplied by frequent parachute drops. Cuni recalls that on one occasion a package was lost containing a thousand gold napoleons.





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pproximately one month after arrival in Albania one of Cuni's men, likel (lnu), who was approximately 23 years of age and a native of legu Mates, Albania, attempted to surrender to the Albanian police. It is a left the main group in an attempt to reach an Albanian police station but was discovered by Cuni before he could co so. Nikel was extremely pervous and stated that he could not continue with the mission and that he wanted to turn himself in to the bigurimit. Cuni took no ction against Mikel because he felt sorry for him and he forgave him.

ntact was established with the Albanian resistance group in the Puka nd Mirdita area approximately two menths after Cuni's arrival in Albania. mong Cuni's contacts in the resistance group was Mil Shlaku. Shlaku rovided valuable military information to Cuni's group, which information he former received from Mark Shlaku (not related) who is presently residing in Shkoder. In early 1951 Mil Shlaku crossed the Albanian border into ugoslavia. Two months after Mil Shlaku escaped to Yugoslavia he rentered Albania on an intelligence mission for UDB and contacted Cuni. hllaku had in his possession various Yugoslav propagance material for istribution in Albania. Cuni was disappointed with Shllaku's mission on the UDB and told him so. Shllaku replied that he had been forced to ndertake the mission. According to Cuni, Shllaku is a very capable and purageous individual whose only weakness is his love of money, for which a would risk everything.

ne day before Ash Wednesday of 1950, Cuni received a radio message from ome advising him that Alush Ileshanaka and his group were to be dropped I the vicinity of Cunits area on the next day. Cuni was instructed to irk the landing spot by lighting four large bonfires. On Ash Wednesday ini learned that Nikol had again left the croup, this time with 15 gold moleons, with the intention of reaching Siguriait. Since Nikol knew of eshanaka's arrival Cuni feared that Nikol would inform the Siguriait; merefore Cuni radioed Rome in an attempt to delay the drop. Since this is not possible, Cuni transferred the drop zone to an area near Honelle. iter Cuni learned from his informants that Nikol had passed through the liages of Puka, Vandajes and Giader, crossing the Drin River by raft th the help of a local villager to whom he paid one gold mapoleon. This rson, who was actually a Sigurimit agent and was suspicious of the gold poleon, reported the incident to Sigurialit which started a search of the ea, arrested Nikol and took him to Tirana. Cuni is certain that Nikol d nut inform the Sigurimit about the mission since there were no reperssions as a result of his arrest. According to information Cuni received Yugoslavia one year ato, Nikol is still in a Tirana prison.

ush Lleshanaka's team arrived on Ash Wednesday with no trouble. The am was to operate in the Elbasan area. Cuni met Lleshanaka approximately ven days after the latter arrived and, after a short stay with Cuni, eshanaka and his group left for Elbasan. The aircraft carrying the



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shanaka group also brought a supply of food which was dropped a short cance away from the area signalled by Cuni. Several of the group were atched to recover the packages. In a fight which ensued between the up and police agents, two of Cuni's men and seven police agents were led.

chanaka operated in the Elbasan area and maintained radio contact with almost on a daily basis. Approximately three months after the arrival leshanaka's group, his radio failed and Elechanaka personally went to usan to obtain spare parts. On the Elbasan-Puka road he met Cuni, who sed him against going to Elbasan and made arrangements to provide the compare parts. Approximately one month later Elechanaka was killed in dirmish with Simurimit agents. One day during a normal patrol by Cuni his area he ran across a person who admitted being a digurimit informant mission to discover anti-Communist activities in the mountain areas. Group decided to execute him on the spot; however, by some strange of the mountains (Kanuni Lek Dukagjinit) the person was spared after had sworn that he would never again engage in any political activity. is convinced that the person kept his word and never reported the sion's presence in the zone.

oso Cuni established contact with three schoolteachers in the vicinity ruka for the purpose of soliciting information of an economic nature a them. Cuni mentioned the name of only one of the teachers, Tolydola. three agreed to provide information. Cuni received valuable information the transmitted to Roos and which he later learned was printed in an icle published by the hercury Press Agency in April 1952 under the head-man Inquiry on Albania. The Hercury Press Agency is located at Via di Ripetta, Rome. Its director is Massimo diffreduzzi and its tor is Nino Jodice.

OSO Curi met Paskuk Sura, an anti-Communist operating in the Mirdita. Suma, a youth of 26 years, had been operating in that area for eral years and was considered one of the most active in the resistance ement and one of the most feared by the communists. He had joined the ht against the communists in order to mindicate the death of his her and five brothers. He was said to have killed more than 200 nunists. Suma was later killed in a fight with approximately 300 ice agents. Suma's name is very popular in the Mirdita Zone and he considered a martyr for the anti-communistic cause.

lian radio support for the team was excellent. One radio message reved from Rome, which particularly impressed Cuni, was a message from Naval Ministry which informed Cuni of an incident which had occurred Puka only 2h hours previous. The message stated that Pal Bib Mirakaj seven Albanians had broken into and robbed a State Cooperative Store Puka and were now proceeding to a mountain hide-out not far from Cuni.

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Home asked Cuni to contact them, which Cuni managed to do. However, it was not until approximately two months later, due to the heavy police activity in the Mirdita zone. During the early part of 1951, Cuni received radio communications from Rome asking whether or not he was acquainted with a certain Albanian from Shkoder who attended the University of Trieste, received a degree in political science in 1961; was married and had one child (AICOMB believes the radio message referred to him). Rome also inquired on the identity of an Albanian from Shkoder who resided in Trieste, then moved to Genoa and later to Rome. This person's brother was a shoemaker in Shkoder (AICOMB believes the message refers to Kol Nogaj who is presently residing in New Haven, Connecticut). The same message was repeated for four days and although Cuni knew the answer he reported negatively to both questions. Cuni still cannot guess the significance of the two questions as they were completely out of context and apparently were asked for no reason.

Cuni stated that today the Albanian anti-communist resistance movement can be considered as a minor force. The communists have kept a close watch on even the smallest nucleus of potential anti-communists and take imediate steps to neutralize them whether they are of an internal nature or infiltrated into Albania from another country. Drastic steps have been taken against anyone assisting the inti-communist resistance groups; the harboring of an anti-communist is a crime punishable by immediate execution of the antiro family of the person involved.

The main difficulty encountered by the anti-communist resistance forces is the lack of food and arms and also the lack of support from the population sho fear the reprisals of the communist authorities. Cuni estimated that approximately 400 persons were arrested during the three years he was in albania as a direct result of their having had contact with Cuni and his group. When Cuni arrived in Albania the resistance movement in the Mirdita bukagjini area numbered over 100 persons. Today Cuni believes that that number has been reduced to less than 30 persons. It is more difficult to conduct clandestine activities now than it was in 1913.

The population is willing to support a large-scale operation with the mission of liberating Albania, but or the other hand the people are afraid to support small scale, harrassing-type operations for fear of reprisals. Duri stated that the people want a Western liberation and, rather than be subject to a liberation by Yugoslavia, they prefer to remain under the present regime.

In 1954, in order to combat the infiltration of Tugoslav teams into tibenia, the Albanian Covernment decided to issue arms to selected persons in the mountainous areas of Malcija, Madhe, Dukagjini and Mirdita. This now had a favorable psychological effect on the people since they felt they were contributing towards the defense of Albania against the Tugoslavs.

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Cuni states that his mission was able to remain in Albania for such a long period due to the following factors:

- a. The support given to Cuni's group by Pal Rib Lirakaj with his numerous faithful friends.
- b. The large amount of money spent by the group in Albania. As an example, Curi cited the case of one family in the vicinity of Iballe which received more than 500 gold napoleons for selling food and clothing to the group.
- c. The cold-blooded courage of the members of the group.
- d. The group's hope of eventually escaping to Greece or Italy rather than by way of Yugoslavia.
- e. The group operated only in the most difficult terrain in the Iballe, Dardhe, Monedhe and Puka areas.

When Cuni decided to cross the border into Yugoslavia, he sent Pal Bib Mirakaj to contact UDB in Gjakova to explain Cuni's position and to determine that treatment the UDB would give to Cuni and his group after crossing into Yugoslavia. Mirakaj spoke to a LDB Major Kapllari (fmu) the assured the former that Cuni's group would be granted political asylum with all rights as political refugees. Prior to leaving Albania, Cuni told Rome of his decision and received permission to do so from Rome with instructions to bury the group's radio in the Konedhe zone at the mouth of the Drin River without telling the other members of the mission. Cuni did as instructed, telling the others that he had destroyed the radio and thrown it into the river.

Cuni crossed the Yugoslav border near Gjakova in May or June 1951. He was accompanied by 25 armed menand four women, one of whom was Farije Haveriqi. In Yugoslavia, Cuni and the group were treated well but isolated from other Albanians for the first several months. During his confinement in Yugoslavia members of Cuni's group were almost completely forgotten by the Italians and they received only a few clothing parcels from Italy.

In 1952, Curi attempted to send a report on Albanian activities in Tugoslavia to the Italians and selected Quazin Gajani, a declared anticommunist and intimate friend of Kol Die Bildurakaj, who resided in
Rome to act as the courier. Curi trusted Gojani, who was ostensibly
a businessman and who had lent Curi and others of his group more than
200,000 dinars. Curi give Gojani a report which the latter was to send
to Kol Bib Bibmirakaj. However, Curi learned that the report was given
by Gojani to Colonel Ceto Mijovic, chief of UDB Albanian operations.
Obviously, Gojani was a UDB informant. Curi was subsequently called by
Mijovic and severely reprinanded for attempting to sneak the report out
of Yugoslavia.



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